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Information and Antitrust: Reflections on
the Gypsum and Engineers Decisions
Richard A. Posner*
A persistent and troublesome question of antitrust policy concerns
the proper treatment of practices and behavior related to the
provision of information to buyers and sellers. The dissemination of
pricinginformation may be evidence offixing, or it may simply be an
efficient market-equilibratingmechanism. In this article, Professor
Posner discusses two recent Supreme Court decisions that have
addressed this problem and then engages in a general analysis of the
problem of information and antitrust. Professor Posner concludes
that an exchange of information should be considered lawful
without regard to market structure or other factors. When appropriate, however, the trier offact should be permitted to treat exchanges
of information as circumstantial evidence of price fixing.
In its 1977 Term, the Supreme Court handed down two antitrust decisions
of general importance: United States v. United States Gypsum Co.1 and
National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States.2 Both decisions
address a persistent and troublesome question of antitrust policy: the proper
treatment under the antitrust laws of practices related to the provision of
information to buyers and sellers. This issue was also at the heart of
Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc.,3 the major antitrust decision of
the previous Term, and was central to notable recent actions in lower
tribunals, including the United States v. General Electric Co.4 decree, more
commonly referred to as the "Westinghouse" decree, and the FTC's
ReaLemon decision. 5 A general analysis of the question of information and
antitrust therefore seems timely and is the subject of Part II of this article.
Part I prefaces the general discussion with a detailed analysis of the Gypsum
and Engineers cases.
I. THE Gypsum AND Engineers DECISIONS
A. GYPSUM
In Gypsum, several major manufacturers of gypsum board were indicted
for alleged violations of section 1 of the Sherman Act. 6 Among the practices
*Lee and Brena Freeman Professor of Law, University of Chicago. B.A. 1959, Yale University; LL.B.
1962, Harvard University. This article is the revised text of an address to the Antitrust Law Section of the
New York Bar Association given on January 24, 1979. I am grateful to Dennis Carlton, Kenneth Dam,
William Landes, and George Stigler for helpful comments on a previous draft of this article.
1. 438 U.S. 422 (1978).
2. 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
3.433 U.S. 36 (1977) (vertical restrictions not illegal per se and should be judged under Rule of Reason).
4. United States v. General Elec. Co., 1977-2 Trade Cases 72,717 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
5. In re Borden, Inc., [1978] ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) E-1 (FTC Nov. 7, 1978).
6. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
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claimed to constitute price fixing, and ultimately the focus of the Government's case, was the practice of "interseller price verification" by which
competing manufacturers exchanged information concerning the current
prices they were charging to specific customers. 7 This was done, defendants
alleged, to prevent customer fraud and to ensure that any price cut offered
was necessary to meet a competitive price and was therefore sheltered from
attack under section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Price Discrimination Act
by section 2(b) of that Act.8 Section 2(b) provides a defense to charges of price
discrimination if the discrimination is made in good faith to meet competition. 9
The principal issues before the Supreme Court in Gypsum were (1) whether
proof of intent is required in a criminal antitrust case and (2) whether section
2(b) of the Robinson-Patman Act insulates interseller price verification from
attack under the Sherman Act. 10 On the first issue the Court held that intent
was a necessary element' and that the jury may not be instructed to find
intent merely because the agreement to exchange price information affected
the level of prices. 12 The jury, however, may infer criminal intent if the
agreement did result in a change in the price level.13 If the agreement is not to
exchange information but to fix prices, the inference of criminal intent is
automatic from proof that the price level was affected.' 4 But in Gypsum itself,
because the ostensible agreement was simply to exchange price information in
order to avoid violating the Robinson-Patman Act, the possibility that the
price level had been altered did not in itself establish the requisite criminal
intent, although an actual change in price level could have been used as a basis
for inferring that intent. 15
Although the Court's analysis may sound reasonable enough, I believe that
it rests on a confusion in the Justices' minds between the level and the
dispersion of prices in a market in which competitors are exchanging price
information. The purpose of a legitimate exchange of price information is to
narrow the dispersion of prices-that is, to eliminate as far as possible those
prices in the tails of the price distribution that reflect the ignorance of buyers
or sellers concerning the conditions of supply and demand. 16 There is no
reason to expect the price level-the average price in the market-to change.
If it does change, that is evidence that the purpose of the exchange of
information was not to narrow the dispersion of prices-a legitimate objective-but rather to raise prices above the competitive level.
To be sure, the level and dispersion of prices are not entirely independent.
A reduction in dispersion, and hence in uncertainty, may result in an increase
7. United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 429 (1978).

8. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a), (b) (1976).
9. 15 U.S.C. § 13(b) (1976). See United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 450-51
(1978) (quoting Standard Oil Co. v. Trade Comm'n, 340 U.S. 231, 249-50(1951)).
10. 438 U.S. at 426.
11. Id. at 435, 443.
12. Id. at 446.
13. Id.

14. See id. at 444 & n.21.
15. Id. at 446.
16. To take a very simple example, suppose that the average price in a market is $100, but 5% of sales
are made at $150, 5% at $50, and the other 90% at $100. If as a result of an exchange of price information,
5% of sales are then made at $130 and 5% at $70, with the other 90% remaining at $100, the dispersion of
prices will have been reduced but the average price of $100 will be unchanged.
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in the price level by facilitating collusion to raise prices. If there is no tacit or
express collusion, however, exchanges of price information designed to reduce
price dispersion should not result in a change in the price level.
Because the Gypsum Court failed to distinguish between the level and the
dispersion of prices, it is not altogether clear that it thought that even a
completely innocent price information exchange might affect the level and not
just the dispersion of prices. But that seems to be what it thought. The price
effect discussed by the Court was "raising, fixing, maintaining, or stabilizing
the price of gypsum board." 17 These terms appear to refer to an impact on the
average price of gypsum and not just to a reduction in the dispersion of prices,
which would leave the average price unchanged. 18 Perhaps the Court was
concerned that an "anticompetitive effect," 1 9 or, in my terminology, an
impact on the price level, could be the inadvertent byproduct of an innocently
motivated exchange of price information. This, however, is unlikely; if the
exchange affected the whole price level, and not merely the distribution of
prices, the inference would be strong that the real purpose of the exchange
was to rig prices. Perhaps the Court was worried that in the trial of an
information exchange case the Government might pick a few prices, an
unrepresentative sample that happened to rise, and argue that the rise proved
that the exchange of price information had affected the price level. In such a
case, however, the average price would presumably remain unchanged. If the
average price does rise and the rise can be traced to the defendants' activities,
the inference of intent to fix prices is again strong.
The Court's apparent confusion between level and distribution of prices
leaves one puzzled about what the Court meant when it indicated that the
criterion for liability in a civil case continues to be proof of either intent to
affect, or effect on, the price level. 20 Does this mean that the Government or a
private plaintiff can prevail in a civil case on a showing that a few prices went
up as a result of a challenged exchange of information, as of course a few
would if the exchange had any effect at all? 21 If so, information exchanges are
illegal per se. But the Court cannot have meant this, for it also stated that
exchanges of price information are not always anticompetitive and are not to
be treated as illegal per se for civil or criminal purposes.22 This statement
suggests that the Court must have intended "anticompetitive effect" to refer
to an effect on the price level and not to an effect on the dispersion of prices or
on a few unrepresentative prices.
This interpretation leads back to the previous problem: If the effect of an
information exchange is to raise the entire price level above the competitive
level-a clearly anticompetitive effect-why are the defendants not presumed
to have intended such an effect under the maxim that a person is presumed to
intend the natural consequence of his acts? 23 Perhaps the answer is that the
17. United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 434 (1978).
18. The term "stabilizing" is the most ambiguous in this string of possible effects. It could be a synonym
for "maintaining"-that is, for preventing price from falling to the competitive level. Or it could refer to
reducing fluctuations in price over time. Either of these effects differs, however, from reducing the
dispersion of prices at any given time.
19. United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 436 n.13 (1978).
20. Id.
21. See note 16 supra and accompanying text.
22. United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 441 n.16 (1978).
23. See id. at 445.
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consequences stemming from an exchange of price information are just too
uncertain to invoke the maxim in the context of a felony criminal prosecution.
If this is the answer, however, the same treatment should be accorded in a
civil case in which the defendant's liability could amount to be hundreds of
millions of dollars.
With regard to the second issue in the case-the defendants' attempted use
of section 2(b) of the Robinson-Patman Act as a defense to a section 1

Sherman Act charge-the Court held that compliance with section 2(b) does
not require actual verification of a competitor's price, and so rejected
"interseller price verification" as a Sherman Act defense. 24 This result has
more significance for actions under the Robinson-Patman Act than under the
Sherman Act. Success for the Robinson-Patman plaintiff is very difficult to
achieve if the meeting-competition defense is liberally construed, because the
usual Robinson-Patman defendant sells at, not below, his competitors' prices.
The Court in Gypsum went out of its way to indicate that the defense is to be

liberally construed, notably by its approving quotation of the FTC's Contiopinion, the high-water mark of FTC liberality in construing
nental Baking
section 2(b). 25
Gypsum's emphasis on the role of interseller price verification in RobinsonPatman cases obscures other and more clearly legitimate functions that such
verification might serve. Buyer fraud is one situation in which verification
may be proper. Apparently it remains a good ground for exchanging price
information. 26 Another and more subtle situation involves control of sales
personnel. A salesperson paid commissions based on sales volume rather than
on profit has an incentive to make a sale at any price rather than to drive the
hardest possible bargain: he receives only a small increase in his commission if
he sells at a higher price, but loses his entire commission if he fails to make the
sale. He may thus misrepresent to his firm a competitor's sales offer in order
to justify the low price at which he asks his firm to approve a sale. 27 In this
24. Id. at 453.
25. Id. at 454 (quoting In re Continental Baking Co., 63 F.T.C. 2071, 2163 (1963)).
Commissioner Elman, whose opinion in Continental Baking was quoted by the Gypsum Court, could
afford to be liberal because he was of the view that the proper way for the FTC to attack Robinson-Patman
problems was to use the FTC's broad rulemaking powers to deal with the entire market at once, rather than
to construe section 2(b) grudgingly, which would only encourage the sort of questionable competitive
exchanges at issue in Gypsum itself. See In re Callaway Mills Co., 64 F.T.C. 732, 748, 756-59 (Elman,
Comm'r, dissenting), vacated sub nom. Callaway Mills Co. v. F.T.C., 362 F.2d 435 (5th Cir. 1966).
Rulemaking is not an option for the private plaintiff in Robinson-Patman cases, and, given the FTC's
diminished enforcement activity in the Robinson-Patman area, it is increasingly the private plaintiff who is
bearing the burden of enforcing the Act. Gypsum makes the private plaintiff's lot a more difficult
one-although from the standpoint of the procompetitive policy of the Sherman Act that is hardly a cause
for regret.
For the latest expression of the Supreme Court's liberality toward the meeting-competition defense, see
Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. F.T.C., 99 S. Ct. 925, 935 (1979) (reduced bid of seller justified by
meeting-competition defense; in light of established business relationship, seller permitted to rely on
buyer's statement that first bid was "not even in the ball park").
26. See United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 448 (1978) (citing Cement Mfrs.
Protective Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 588 (1925) (interseller price verification plan exempt from
Sherman Act liability because a response to customers' fraudulent practices)).
27. The firm could solve this problem by paying its sales representatives on the basis of profits rather
than on the basis of sales generated. Sales personnel, however, may resist this method of compensation
because it is difficult for them to monitor the firm's determination of the profit generated by a particular
sale.
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circumstance, interseller price verification might have a useful and legitimate
function, though perhaps offset by its anticompetitive potential. In any event,
the Robinson-Patman Act provides too limited a framework within which to
evaluate the economic merits of exchanging price information. Part II of this

article proposes a broader framework.
B. ENGINEERS

Engineers28 was a civil action brought by the United States under section 1

of the Sherman Act to eliminate a canon of ethics of the engineers'

professional association forbidding its members to engage in competitive

bidding. 29 The Supreme Court's result 3o was, as we shall see, unexceptionable,

even granting-as I would do-that the prevention of fraud is a proper
concern of a trade or professional association. 31 The aspect of Engineers that
has aroused the most interest is whether the opinion's long discussion of the

Rule of Reason fills the gap that several commentators had noted in the
Sylvania32 opinion:
the absence of any guidelines for the trial of a Rule of
33

Reason case.

Engineers does not fill the gap. The Court does state emphatically that the

only considerations relevant to application of the Rule of Reason are
competitive considerations,

34 but

Sylvania had already made that clear. 35 The

difficult question left open by Sylvania and not addressed by Engineers was
how the competitive considerations are to be ordered, weighed, and woven
into a usable test. How important are market shares? Is there a threshold

market share below which a Rule of Reason charge must fail, as several

circuits have suggested? 36 Alternatively, does the complaint fail if a substan-

tial procompetitive reason for the challenged restriction can be shown? Or is a
court really supposed to balance the gains to competition in one market

against the losses in another-for example, interbrand against intrabrand
competition? Do the courts have the tools to perform such a balancing act?

Only one question relevant to the implementation of a Rule of Reason
approach was conceivably resolved in Engineers, and the manner in which the
28. National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 681 (1978).
29. Id. at 681, 682-83.
30. Id. at 692-93.
31. Id. at 693-94. The Court rejected the Society's affirmative defense that competitive bidding would
lead to deceptively low bids and inferior work, thereby endangering public safety and health.
32. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
33. See Posner, The Rule of Reason and the EconomicApproach: Reflections on the Sylvania Decision, 45
U. CHi. L. REV. 1 (1977). The "Rule of Reason" is that challenged conduct must be shown to be an
unreasonablerestriction of competition in order to be held to violate the Sherman Act. The rule has been
throughout most of its history more a euphemism for nonliability than an administrable test of legality. Id.
at 14.
34. National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 681, 691 (1978).
35. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 59 (1977).
36. See Northwest Power Prods., Inc. v. Omark Indus., Inc., 576 F.2d 83, 90-91 (5th Cir. 1978)
(successful defendant had 25% share of power-actuated tool market but still lacked power to unreasonably
restrain trade, given particular industry structure); Oreck Corp. v. Whirlpool Corp., 563 F.2d 54, 56 (2d
Cir. 1977) (unsuccessful plaintiff alleging that cancellation of its exclusive distributorship was part of
conspiracy to restrain unreasonably the sale of vacuum cleaners in U.S. had only 1% market share);
George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc., 508 F.2d 547, 562 (1st Cir. 1974) (successful
defendant's share of public swimming pool construction market would increase from 2.7% to 3% if
plaintiff was eliminated).
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Court handled it leads one to doubt whether the question has really been laid
to rest. The Court noted that a defendant may not justify a restriction
challenged under the Rule of Reason by reference to a gain in efficiency that
does not increase competition. 37 But when a seller imposes a restriction that
enables it to overcome some obstacle to effective sale or promotion, such as
the free-rider problem involved in Sylvania,38 the removal of the obstacle will
lead to an increase in competition, for by lowering the seller's costs vis-a-vis
those of other firms, it will induce the seller to expand its output. Therefore,
because the usual Rule of Reason case involves a market with competitors, an
emphasis on competitive factors will usually allow consideration of any
efficiency arguments that a defendant might offer on behalf of the challenged
practice.
Occasionally, however, a firm or a group of firms may have no competitors
and yet still adopt some restrictive practice that might so reduce costs as to be,
on balance, reasonable under a sensibly interpreted Rule of Reason. For
example, suppose that there are only two firms in a market, that they do not
compete vigorously, and that as a result their market price is well above their
costs. They merge and obtain such great cost savings that the profitmaximizing monopoly price, which they now charge, is lower than the price
that prevailed before the merger. Even here, there is a subtle procompetitive
effect because the lower price will attract business from sellers of substitute
products, increasing the competition that those sellers face. But I shall ignore
this possibility, as did the Court, which suggested that there can be no defense
based on superior efficiency because the Rule of Reason allows only
competitive benefits and detriments to be weighed; 39it does not allow pure
efficiency considerations as defense or extenuation.
This view ignores, however, a long line of cases, including United States v.
Aluminum Co. of America (Alcoa),40 perhaps the apex of judicial hostility to
monopoly, which have made clear that if a market is a natural monopoly, in
the sense that the conditions of demand and supply are such that one firm can
supply the entire demand at a lower cost than two or more firms could do, a
consolidation of all of the firms in the market would not violate the Sherman
Act. 41 Because one cannot believe that the Court intended to overrule these
decisions in a case not remotely relevant to the status of natural monopoly
under the Sherman Act, the status of a pure efficiency defense in Rule of
Reason cases is best regarded as unresolved by Engineers.
The difficulty the courts are finding in giving content to the Rule of
Reason, a difficulty illustrated by the confused discussion in Engineers,42
leads one to wonder whether the Rule of Reason can answer the question of
how antitrust policy is to respond to buyer and seller information needs. I
shall return to this question. Before I do, however, I want to address more
directly the question of the proper treatment under the antitrust laws of
efforts to provide more, or more truthful, information in markets.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 681, 689-90 (1978).
Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 55, 56 (1977).
National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 681, 689-92 & n.16 (1978).
148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
See id. at 429-30 (citing cases).
National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 681, 687-92 (1978).
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II. THE TREATMENT OF INFORMATION UNDER THE ANTITRUST LAWS
A. THE COMPETITIVE PROVISION OF INFORMATION

For at least a century, economists have been concerned that a purely
competitive market would not produce enough information.4 3 The underlying
problem of information production is the difficulty of appropriating as private
profits any of the social benefits that the disseminator of information creates.
Unlike most goods, information is not consumed by use. If I, a farmer, sell
you an apple, and you eat it, no one else can eat it; thus anyone who wants my
apples will have to do business with me and will have to compensate me for
my costs in growing them. But if I sell you an idea, and you use it to produce
something that reveals the idea, anyone else can use the idea without dealing
with me. Of course the law may seek to prevent such appropriation. The
point, however, is that some legal intervention or other "artificial" restriction
is necessary to make an idea a saleable commodity. 44
The patent laws impose the necessary restriction, but only in respect to a
very limited range of ideas. If by advertising Brand X motorcycles a seller
provides general information about motorcycles that competitors can exploit
to sell their own brand, nothing in the patent or any other laws will prevent
these competitors and their customers from using the information without
compensation.
The inapplicability of the patent laws to the uncompensated use of a vast
range of types of information has given rise to a demand for private
restrictions on information. These restrictions, however, conflict with antitrust principles that have been generally insensitive to the problem of
information. Even today, some readers of this article will have difficulty
recognizing in the above discussion the issue at the heart of the Schwinn45 and
Sylvania46 cases. If one dealer invests heavily in advertising, promotion,
display, inventory, and other presale services all directed toward providing
the consumer with information relevant to his choice among brands, other
dealers in the same brand will have an incentive to "free ride" on the
investment of the first. They will encourage their customers to get the
information from the first dealer and then come back to them to make their
purchase at a lower price-which they can afford to charge because they bear
none of the expenses of producing the information. 47 It is the same free-riding
problem as in the case of (1) the motorcycle producers who ride the coattails
of the producer who is increasing the demand'for motorcycles in general, and
(2) the producer who copies the innovation of a competitor. But Sylvania
leaves unanswered the question whether the recognition of the information
43. See H. SIDGWICK, THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 406-08 (3d ed. 1901).
44. The purist would note that legal intervention-in the form of laws preventing trespass to or
conversion of personal property-is also necessary in the apple case to enable the market to operate.
45. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967) (bicycle manufacturer imposed
vertical restrictions on territories and ultimate sale of its product; if products were sold outright to
distributor, manufacturer enjoined from imposing any limitations on resale; if manufacturer retained title
to product under consignment plan, Rule of Reason applied to determine legality of restrictions).
46. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
47. For a discussion of the free-rider problem and its relation to restrictions in distribution see R.
POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 147-66 (1976).
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free-riding problem in the particular factual setting of that case will carry over
to quite different settings that raise the same fundamental problem of
information externalities.
The collection and dissemination of market price information, the activity
involved in the Gypsum case,48 is one of those other settings. The information
in question is not advertising, but should not be accorded less consideration
on that account-some might want to accord it more. It is important for a
producer to know the prices at which transactions occur in his market. In
principle, to be sure, he could operate in a complete information vacuum with
regard to pricing. He could pick a price at random and then observe the
market response to his offer. If he found that he was piling up a large
inventory of unsold goods, he would infer that he was pricing above the
market level and would reduce his price; if he found that he could not produce
fast enough to keep up with demand, he would conclude that he was pricing
below the market and would increase his price. This process of trial and error
would lead him gradually to the profit-maximizing price and output, which in
a competitive market would also be the socially optimal price and output. Of
course, this level would be temporary, because as soon as demand or supply
conditions changed he would find his price either too high or too low and the
process of trial and error would begin anew. This blind groping for an everchanging equilibrium may not be the most efficient way to set price and
output levels in a market. With all producers operating in the dark there
could be a wide dispersion of prices, with pockets of glut and shortage existing
side-by-side.
To be sure, if the costs of consumer search are low, the dispersion of prices
resulting from producer ignorance may be dissipated rapidly. Producers may
help to keep those costs.low through advertising. Most economic analyses of
competition under uncertainty have, in fact, focused on consumer search as
the equilibrating mechanism.4 9 Producer exchange of information has been
neglected. Yet even a casual examination of markets in the real world reveals
a variety of mechanisms, involving the direct or indirect exchange of
information among producers, by which price dispersion may be reduced.
These include: (1) organized markets, such as stock and commodity exchanges, which seek to eliminate price dispersions by pooling all buy and sell
offers outstanding at the same time; (2) statistical reporting services in many
of the industries that do not trade through organized markets-and in many
that do, because sales may occur off the exchange; (3) trade association
collection and dissemination of market statistics, and (4) direct exchange of
price information-sometimes without sinister intent-by competing firms.
What lawyer has not asked a fellow lawyer, within or without his own firm,
what fee he charges for a particular type of service?
In short, the producer's need to have information about his competitors-including the prices they charge, their output, the quality and reliability
of their service, their investment plans, their costs-is not always or obviously
less important from the standpoint of efficiency than the consumer's interest
in knowing what the market has to offer. In fact, the two interests are closely
48. United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 428 (1978).
49. For a recent example of this literature, see J. Pratt, D. Wise, and R. Zeckhauser, Price Differences in
Almost Competitive Markets (Nov., 1978) (unpublished manuscript at Harvard University) (copy on file
at Georgetown Law Journal).
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related because the consumer's search costs will be higher, other things being
equal, in a market in which prices are highly dispersed than in a market in
which prices are not so dispersed. If, as Sylvania seems to teach, the
consumer's information needs are sufficiently important to warrant restrictive
arrangements designed to promote fulfillment of those needs, even at some
cost in reduced price competition among dealers, why could not the
producer's information needs also justify some activities that have restrictive
effects as an unavoidable byproduct? Suppose, for example, in the setting of
an organized market like a stock exchange, that some traders decide to take a
free ride by trading off the market on the basis of price information generated
by that market. If the exchange sought to prevent such activity by adopting a
bylaw forbidding its members to trade off the market-one interpretation of
the facts in Chicago Board of Trade v. United States50-that should not be
deemed a per se unlawful restriction, especially in light of Sylvania, which
permits a manufacturer to restrict competition among his dealers in order to
prevent free riding on the information-generating efforts of some of them. 5 1
The Hardwood case provides another illustration of the free-riding problem
in producer information. 52 That case involved the collection and dissemination of price information in the hardwood lumber market, which consisted of
more than a thousand widely scattered mills, many quite small. Their product
was not traded in an organized market that would have brought buyers and
sellers together. Given the geographical dispersion and large number of
buyers and sellers, the probability of a wide dispersion in prices must have
been great. Yet no single firm would have had an incentive to gather and
disseminate price statistics because the benefits of its efforts would have
accrued mainly to the other firms in the industry. The formation of a trade
association was a partial answer to the free-rider problem-partial because
firms still had an incentive to free ride on the association's activities, which
they could do by not joining the association yet using the information
gathered by it. 3 In fact, only a fraction
of the hardwood mills in the country
belonged to the trade association. 54
That the Manager of Statistics of the association tried to curry favor with
his employers by urging the members of the industry to keep their prices up
and by bragging that his exhortations had been effective 55 should not have
sufficed to condemn the association's socially-useful activity of collecting and
50. 246 U.S. 231 (1918) (Board of Trade "call rule" requiring uniform price for purchases of to-bedelivered grain occurring between close of exchange and opening on following day held not to violate
Sherman Act).
51. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 54-55, 58-59 (1977).
52. American Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377 (1921) ("Open Competition Plan"
of hardwood producers, in which disclosure of pertinent aspects of business made to clearinghouse that
supplied analysis of overall market and suggestions for future production and pricing, held to be an
unlawful restraint of trade).
53. The association might have an incentive to disseminate the information even to nonmembers,
because the more sellers the information reached the more likely it would be that the price dispersion of the
market would be decreased. But even if the association were able to withhold the information from the free
riders, they would still be taking a free ride on the improved market conditions generated by the
association's efforts, to the extent that those efforts were effective.
54. Participants in the "Plan" operated 5% of the mills engaged in hardwood manufacture in the United
States. 257 U.S. at 391. The Court discounted this statistic by noting that the Plan participants produced
one-third of the total hardwood output in the United States. Id.
55. Id, at 403-07.
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disseminating detailed price information. This information gave the members
of the association a much clearer idea of the competitive conditions facing
them. The very large number of sellers56 precluded an inference that the real
purpose or probable effect of the exchange
was to raise the average price in
the market above the competitive price. 57
Justice Holmes, in a dissenting opinion, clearly grasped the essential
distinction between activities designed to reduce the dispersion of prices and
activities designed to raise the average price, a distinction that, as I noted
earlier, continues to elude the Court. Holmes stated:
When there are competing sellers of a class of goods, knowledge of
the total stock on hand, of the probable total demand, and of the
prices paid, of course will tend to equalize the prices asked. But I
should have supposed that the Sherman Act did not set itself
against knowledge-did not aim at a transitory cheapness unprofitable to the community as a whole because not corresponding
to the actual conditions of the country. I should have thought that
the ideal of commerce was an intelligent interchange made with
full knowledge of the facts as a basis for a forecast of the future on
both sides. A combination to get and distribute such knowledge,
notwithstanding its tendency to equalize, not necessarily to raise,
prices,58is very far from a combination in unreasonable restraint of
trade.
Although the Court enjoined the exchange of information in the Hardwood
case, its decision did not settle the issue of the legality of exchanging price
information, whether through a trade association or any other means. In the
Hardwood case it was clear that the statistician of the association was trying,
however factitiously or ineffectually, to do more than facilitate an exchange of
information, and his intent was enough to make the case one of attempted and
therefore unlawful price fixing. Until the Container decision,5 9 subsequent
cases cast little light on the permissibility of exchanging price information.
The Court in Containerthought the structure of the market decisive to the
legality of an agreement by a group of competitors to exchange price
information, and strongly implied that such exchanges were illegal per se in
"oligopolistic" markets, but not in nonoligopolistic markets. 60 The continued
vitality of this aspect of Container has been placed in doubt by the Supreme
Court's decision in United States v. Citizens & Southern National Bank.61
The Court stated that "the dissemination of price information is not itself a
56. There were 365 participants in the Plan. Id. at 391.
57. See R. POSNER, supra note 47, at 52-54.
58. American Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377, 412 (1921) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting)
(emphasis added).
59. United States v. Container Corp. of America, 393 U.S. 333 (1969) (manufacturers of corrugated
containers, who supplied 90% of relevant market, disclosed to each other upon request most recent price
charged or quoted to specific customer; information exchange held to "stabilize" a downward price trend,
making practice unlawful under § 1 of Sherman Act).
60. Id. at 337.
61. 422 U.S. 86 (1975) (to circumvent stringent restrictions on establishment of suburban branches by
city banks, defendant bank formed holding company that established de facto branches; bank's practice of
founding such branches held not to infringe § I of Sherman Act).
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per se violation of the Sherman Act."'62 The Court cited for this proposition
Justice Fortas' concurring opinion in Container, which consists of an
emphatic repudiation of any suggestion that exchanges of price information
might be illegal per se. 63 Indeed, it seems possible to read Justice Fortas'
opinion-consistently with the position that I am urging here-as suggesting
that the exchange in Containerwas unlawful because there was evidence that
it actually affected the level of prices. I said earlier that a proper information
exchange would affect the distribution, but not level, of price.
Gypsum is in the spirit of Citizens & Southern in suggesting that the legality
of an information exchange is to be appraised on the facts of each case,
without necessarily attaching controlling weight to the presence or absence of
oligopolistic elements. Yet the Gypsum Court cited Container with apparent
approval. 64 And the Court's inability in Gypsum to distinguish between the
effect of information on the dispersion of prices in a market and its effect on
the average price in the market suggests that the Court lacks a sure grasp of
the fundamental economics of the issue. The current legal status of competitive exchanges of price information is uncertain.
B. A SUGGESTED APPROACH

I want to suggest an approach that would dispel this uncertainty in a
manner consistent with the fundamental spirit, if not the specific results and
narrow holdings, of the series of price exchange cases from Hardwood to
Gypsum. 65 The heart of my proposal is that an agreement simply to exchange
price information should not be regarded as a violation of the antitrust laws.
Such an agreement should only be admissible as evidence of an agreement to
fix prices, which would be, in my view, unlawful whether express or tacit. If
the trier of fact is satisfied that a group of firms has agreed to exchange price
information but has not directly or indirectly, tacitly or explicitly, formally or
informally, agreed to fix prices, there should be no finding of a Sherman Act
violation. The likely effect of an agreement just to exchange price information
will be to narrow the dispersion of prices, which is a good thing, rather than to
raise the average price above the competitive level, which would be a bad
thing. If the only thing that a group of competitors does is exchange price
information-no matter how detailed the information is, how frequently it is
exchanged, or whether it pertains to past or current prices-the price level
will be unaffected. Some firms will discover that their prices are too high,
others that their prices are too low, but the average price should be
unchanged. 66 Narrowing the dispersion of prices will have none of the bad
effects associated with monopoly or price fixing; on the contrary, it will bring
the pricing in the market more closely in line with the conditions that would
prevail under perfect competition.
It is of course arguable that an agreement to exchange price information
will also eliminate the uncertainty and mistrust that prevent "conscious
62. Id. at 113.
63. United States v. Container Corp. of America, 393 U.S. 333, 338-40 (1969) (Fortas, J., concurring).
64. United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 441 n.16. (1978).
65. The discussion that follows modifies my earlier expressed views on this subject. See R. POSNER,
supra note 47, at 135-47.
66. If average price rose, it would imply that before the exchange of information the industry had a rate
of return below the competitive level, which is unlikely, certainly over a prolonged period of time.
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parallelism" or other versions of tacit collusion that are too subtle to be
identified by the methods of litigation from being effective substitutes for
outright collusion. To this it may be replied that whatever mistrust bedevils
the underlying tacit agreement not to compete will equally bedevil the
agreement to exchange price information: a firm that wants to undersell its
competitors secretly will simply submit false price information. 67 This point
assumes that the agreement to exchange price information is not legally
enforceable. If it is enforceable, the parties will have legal remedies for breach
of the agreement and the threat of suit will greatly reduce the problem of
cheating. One possibility, then, would be to allow firms to agree to exchange
price information but to refuse to allow them to invoke the aid of the courts,
directly or indirectly, in the enforcement of such an agreement. The
agreement would be unenforceable as against public policy, but not illegal.
There would be, then, a threefold division among agreements to exchange
price information: (1) perfectly lawful agreements, (2) gray-area agreements,
which the courts would not enforce but which the antitrust laws would not
forbid; and (3) agreements unlawful under the antitrust laws because they
amount to price fixing.
An alternative approach that I have advocated elsewhere and favor here is
to deem tacit collusion itself a form of actionable price fixing. 68 An agreement
to exchange information ancillary to tacit collusion would be unlawful
without more. This approach allows preservation of a clear distinction
between the agreement to exchange price information, which, standing alone,
should always be lawful, and the agreement that is a mask for, or incident to,
actionable price fixing and is therefore unlawful. Alternatives to this approach would be (1) to ban information exchanges in highly concentrated
markets, a potentially unsatisfactory approach both because of uncertainty
about what threshold of concentration to use and because of considerations
that we shall encounter in discussing the Westinghouse decree; 69 or (2) to
decide information exchange cases under a broad Rule of Reason approach,
an unattractive alternative given the vagueness of the Rule of Reason, which
Engineers did not dispel.
Still another possible approach would be to focus on the form of the
information exchange. Professor Baxter has suggested that telephonic or faceto-face exchanges of price information be forbidden because of the difficulty
of policing the conversation to make sure that the communicating sellers do
not go beyond a simple exchange of price information, and actually fix
prices. 70 The logic of that proposal, however, suggests outlawing trade
association meetings because competitors attending them could use the
occasion to fix prices. To be sure, counsel may be present in the formal
meetings of the association to prevent just such conduct, but the participants
can discuss prices in the hotel corridors just as easily as they can during a
telephone conversation. One might as well forbid competitors to belong to the
same country clubs.
The result in Hardwood is consistent with my proposal that a pure
agreement to exchange price information, unrelated to any underlying
67.
68.
69.
70.

I am indebted to George Stigler for this point.
See R. POSNER, supra note 47, ch. 4.
See notes 72-78 infra and accompanying text.
Baxter, Book Review, 8 BELL J. EcON. 609, 615-16(1977).
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actionable price-fixing conspiracy, should not be deemed unlawful. Hardwood
turned on evidence of intent to fix prices on the part of the association's
Manager of Statistics. Containeris inconsistent with my approach in result; it
found an agreement to exchange prices illegal without suggesting that it was
ancillary to some further agreement to fix prices. My approach, however, is
consistent with the basic premise of the Container Court's analysis-that
"interference with the setting of price by free-market forces is unlawful per
se." 71 A pure agreement to exchange price information improves the operation of the free market by narrowing the dispersion of prices and thereby
bringing the market closer to the model of a perfectly competitive market.
In short, I do not believe that an agreement to exchange price information
is some sort of halfway house between competition and price fixing, the
legality of which should be decided sometimes one way, sometimes the other,
depending on the structure of the market. A pure agreement to exchange
price information should always be considered lawful. Market structure
becomes relevant only when the Government or a private plaintiff argues, as
it is always free to do, that the existence of the agreement to exchange
information provides circumstantial evidence of an underlying agreement to
fix prices. Suppose, for example, that there were only two firms in a market,
selling a completely homogeneous product to knowledgeable buyers, and that
the two firms agreed on a very detailed exchange of current and future prices.
The probability that, in the absence of an exchange of information, prices
would be widely dispersed-to the prejudice of buyers, who would buy at
widely varying prices and sometimes encounter shortages or queues-would
be very small. There would thus be a strong basis for an inference that the
agreement was a mask for something more sinister. Similarly, if the effect of
the information exchange were to raise the level and not merely reduce the
dispersion of prices, one could infer that the motive was price fixing. I do not
want to speculate on how much circumstantial evidence should be deemed
sufficient to convict a firm of price fixing. My point is only that it makes more
sense to treat an agreement to exchange price information as possible
circumstantial evidence of price fixing than as an independent antitrust
violation.
Gypsum says too little about the standards for judging such agreements to
allow a confident prediction that the Court will soon adopt any such
approach as I have just proposed. The Court's confusion of the level and
dispersion of prices in a market bodes ill for the chances that it will embrace
an approach that attaches decisive significance to that distinction. But there is
a judicial vacuum here that must be filled. In Container the Court came close
to declaring a per se rule against exchanges of price information in any market
that is slightly removed from the model of perfect competition-which means
most markets-but it has since veered away from that position, and now the
bar does not know the status of such agreements.
C. THE WESTINGHOUSE DECREE

It may assist understanding of my position to depart momentarily from the
Supreme Court's decisions and glance at the recent and already celebrated
71. United States v. Container Corp. of America, 393 U.S. 333, 337 (1969).
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Westinghouse decree. 72 This decree, entered into in 1977 with the consent of
the parties-United States, plaintiff, and General Electric (GE) and Westinghouse, defendants-modified the judgment entered against the defendants in
73
1962 enjoining their participation in the electrical price-fixing conspiracy.
The new order enjoins the defendants from engaging in certain practices that
the Department of Justice contends have prevented competitive pricing in the
electrical turbine generator industry, in which GE and Westinghouse are
currently the only competitors. 74 These practices relate mainly to the
dissemination of price information. The defendants are enjoined from disseminating information about prices or price changes-other than to customers, of course-or circulating "price books" or other formulas from which a
competitor might readily compute the price the seller was planning to bid.5
Some of the enjoined practices do not seem on their face informational in
nature but are objected to because they make it more costly for the defendants
to engage in price competition. Notably, the decree enjoins the practice of
promising a customer that if a generator is later sold at a lower price to
another customer the price76 paid by the first customer will be reduced to the
level of the second price.

This "price protection" clause, by making it more costly for a competing
firm to lower its price, could be ancillary to a tacit agreement to fix prices.
Therefore, if one thought such an agreement likely, one might want to enjoin
the clause as a prophylactic measure. The fact that GE and Westinghouse
used to fix prices expressly may suggest that such a tacit agreement was likely.
But there is another side to the price protection clause. Its existence may
attest to underlying uncertainty about the conditions of demand and supply,
and hence about price, notwithstanding the fewness of sellers. The existence
of the clause implies that there is frequently a dispersion of prices for the same
generator within the interval of time to which the clause applies. The clause
eliminates this dispersion. That is not an obviously bad thing to do. Price
protection might be sought by customers in order to eliminate the competitive
disparities that would be created by the near-simultaneous sale of the same

product at different prices, 77 or in order to reduce search costs-the

customers would invest less effort in determining the best time to buy. A
question of risk allocation is also involved.
A facile resolution of the price protection question is that the uncertainty
giving rise to price dispersion is an artifact of tacit collusion combined with
occasional secret discounting, and is to be encouraged because it will
eventually result in a collapse of the collusive scheme. This is not an absurd
argument. The Justice Department's own memorandum supporting the
modification of the decree, however, provides an alternative explanation for
the price dispersion and hence for the price protection clause. It notes that

72. United States v. General Elec. Co., 1977-2 Trade Cases 72,717 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
73. United States v. General Elec. Co., 1962 Trade Cases 76,984 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
74. United States v. General Elec. Co., 1977-2 Trade Cases 72,715, 72,716 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
75. United States v. General Elec. Co., 1977-2 Trade Cases 72,717, 72,718-20 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
76. Id. at 72,718.
77. To be sure, the customers are electrical utilities, which ordinarily do not compete with one another
but serve exclusive territories. There is, however, some competition even in the electrical utility business,
and, in any event, public utility commissions will sometimes look to costs of other utilities in deciding
whether a particular utility's costs were prudently incurred. See 2 A. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF
REGULATION 95-112(1971).
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very few generators are sold each year. 78 A few unexpected new orders or
unexpected cancellations can result in dramatic swings in sales. This situation
creates a potential for price dispersion. GE might find itself with a cancellation after it had already sunk substantial costs into the production of the
generator; seeking to cut its losses it might offer a lower price than it had
offered just a few weeks earlier. This would be reasonable competitive
conduct-but it would also be reasonable for the previous customers to have
requested, and to have compensated GE for providing, assurance that they
would get the benefit of any subsequent price cut. For, apart from other
reasons noted earlier, these circumstances create uncertainty on the part of
buyers about what price they will have to pay for an electrical generator.
There is the risk of making a very poor, or a very good, buy. Price protection
shifts the risk of a price change from customer to seller within the interval
covered by the clause; depending on the parties' attitudes toward risk and on
other factors, this shift may yield a gain in welfare.
The small number of annual sales also suggests the appropriateness of a
more tolerant attitude toward the dissemination of price books and other
price information than might otherwise be warranted. The consequences of
not knowing at what price your competitor is going to sell his product are
serious in a market in which each sale is a large fraction of one's annual
business. It might seem, however, that the costs of discovering the rival's
prices, given the infrequency of sales and the scarcity of rivals, would be low
even if exchanges of price information were forbidden. The very paucity of
transactions, however, may result in price uncertainty, as where the market
value of a particular house cannot be estimated accurately because there have
been few recent house sales in the neighborhood.
Were it not for the infrequency of sales, the small number of firms in the
market (two) would suggest, as I pointed out earlier, that the exchange of
price information was masking an agreement to fix prices. But given the
infrequency of sales a deeper investigation of the competitive performance of
the market than that reflected in the Justice Department's memorandum
would be necessary to support the Department's belief that the information
exchange was indeed just a mask for a continuation of the price-fixing
agreement enjoined by the original decree.
My analysis of the Westinghouse decree suggests that a rule that would ban
all exchanges of price information in concentrated industries would be too
sweeping. Other factors may outweigh the significance of seller concentration
in particular cases. There is also the difficulty of agreeing on the concentration threshold beyond which exchanges of price information would be illegal.
I prefer to cast the inquiry in terms of whether the exchange of price
information is ancillary to express or tacit price fixing; only then should it be
forbidden. In the absence of direct evidence of intent, the inquiry would focus
on whether the exchange of information had affected the level, or merely the
distribution, of prices. If the former, it would be strong evidence that the
exchange was ancillary to price fixing and hence unlawful. Many will doubt
that it is within the capacity of the courts to assimilate the sorts of economic
78. Plaintiffs Memorandum in Support of a Proposed Modification of a Final Judgment Entered on
October 1, 1962 Against Each Defendant, at 5 (filed December 10, 1976), United States v. General Elec.
Co. & Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 1977-2 Trade Cases 72,717 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (copy on file at the
Georgetown Law Journal).
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data and analyses necessary to distinguish these effects. My response is that
the courts will be able to solve the hard problems concerning collusion,
including the threat of price fixing presented by the exchange of information
among competitors, only when they learn to use economic data, as well as
economic reasoning, in the enforcement of the Sherman Act.
D. FRAUD

Let me turn very briefly to the substantive issue in the Engineers79 case,
which is again one of information and competition. The defendant professional association had adopted a rule forbidding members to seek engineering
contracts through competitive bidding or even to quote a price in advance of
being selected by the client. 80 Once an engineer was selected the client could
attempt to negotiate a satisfactory fee, and if the negotiations broke down the
client could approach another engineer. 81 At no time, however, would the
client be able to solicit simultaneous competing bids.82 The rationale for this
rule, which the Supreme Court struck down as a violation of section 1 of the
Sherman Act, was that competitive bidding would encourage fraud. 83 The
association had argued that an engineer might submit a proposal that was
inadequate from an engineering standpoint in order to underbid his competitors, and the quality of engineering work would thereby be driven below
acceptable levels. 84 The problem with this argument is that the purchasers of
engineering services can decide for themselves whether the gains from lower
prices outweigh the possible quality losses from encouraging price competition. If the association's argument is correct, it will presumably persuade the
vast majority of the purchasers of engineering services; there is no basis,
however, for withdrawing the decision to accept or reject the argument from
the customers. There is no free-rider problem of the sort that might justify a
restrictive agreement among competing sellers.
A true fraud issue was raised in Borden's successful resistance to the
proposed divestiture of its ReaLemon trademark. 85 The FTC found that
Borden had unlawfully monopolized the market for reconstituted lemon
juice. 86 The administrative law judge thought the most effective way of
dissipating the monopoly was to force Borden to divest itself of its ReaLemon
trademark. 87 Had his divestiture decree been upheld, 88 it would have been an
example of the use of the antitrust laws to increase the costs of information. If
other manufacturers had been free to use the name "ReaLemon" for their
concentrated lemon juice, the consumer who happened to prefer to buy from
79. National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
80. Id. at 682-83 & n.3.
81. Id. at 684 n.6.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Id. at 692.
Id. at 684-85 & n.7.
Id.
In re Borden, Inc., [1978] ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) E-1 (FTC Nov. 7, 1978).

86. Id. at E-9.
87. Id. at E-1.
88. The Commission avoided deciding whether it had the power to order compulsory licensing of a
trademark, id. at E-l, concluding that an order prohibiting ReaLemon from pricing to exclude or minimize
new entry into the market would be sufficient to dissipate ReaLemon's unlawfully maintained monopoly
position. Id. at E-10. The order is printed at E-18.
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Borden would have found it more costly to exercise his preference. Indeed,
consumers who did prefer Borden and did not know about the divestiture
decree would probably have been deceived into thinking that they were
continuing to purchase Borden's brand when they were not. Because there
was some evidence in the case that Borden's leading competitor had
adulterated its reconstituted lemon juice, 89 a consumer preference for Borden
could hardly be viewed as irrational.
CONCLUSION

The cases of the 1977 Term, together with the Sylvania case of the Term
before, highlight the problems of formulating sound antitrust policy once the
importance of information in the competitive process is recognized. The
direct or indirect exchange of price information by competitors can serve
procompetitive, pro-efficiency purposes even in markets with only a few
sellers. I no longer believe that there is any satisfactory rule of thumb or
shortcut for determining when such exchanges should be suppressed. 90 A
better approach is the following: Consider the exchange of information to be a
lawful practice under section 1 of the Sherman Act regardless of the level of
concentration or other factors; but, when appropriate, allow the trier of fact
to consider exchanges of information, other communications among the
parties to an alleged conspiracy, and such other relevant circumstances as the
effect on the price level as distinct from the change in the dispersion of prices,
as circumstantial evidence of alleged price fixing.
89. Id. at E-8.
90. See note 65 supra.
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